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Not all that begins in hope ends in happiness. In Egypt, the
exuberance of Tahrir Square has given way to frustration over the
resilience of the security state;1 in Libya, the anti-Qaddafi movement
has fractured along tribal and factional lines;2 in Syria, as of this
* Rosa Brooks is Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center
and a Schwartz Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation. From 2009 to
2011, Brooks served as Counselor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
and Special Coordinator for Rule of Law at the U.S. Department of Defense.
1. See, e.g., Sarah Topol, The Opposition in Egypt Splinters and Sputter, N.Y.
TIMES LATITUDE BLOG (June 8, 2012, 9:02 AM), http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/
2012/06/08/the-opposition-in-egypt-splinters-and-sputters (describing the Egyptian
opposition as fragmented in their efforts to unite around a presidential candidate
and stating that the opposition’s failure to do so has inhibited their ability to
rebuild the Egyptian government).
2. See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Libya Postpones National Election Until
July, as Preparations Lag, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/06/11/world/africa/libya-to-delay-national-election.html?_r=1&partner=rss&
emc=rss (noting that hostility toward the interim authorities has caused elections to
be postponed, that there are disagreements over the distribution of delegates, and
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writing, calls for reform continue to be met with gunfire from
government forces.3 Throughout the Middle East—from Egypt,
Libya, and Syria to Yemen, Tunisia, Bahrain, and elsewhere—the
heady excitement of 2010 has given way to a more sober awareness
that enduring political change may take years, if not generations.4
The Arab Spring brought both progress and turmoil, and its longterm impact remains uncertain.
For international law, the import of the Arab Spring is similarly
ambiguous. On the one hand, as Juan Mendez and others have
argued,5 the Arab Spring can be viewed as the world’s first true
human rights revolution: the young protesters of the Arab street
spoke the language of democracy and human rights, and the
international community responded in the same lexicon, with
references to human rights law and international criminal law, and
referrals to the institutions that help sustain them (such as the UN
Human Rights Council and the International Criminal Court
(“ICC”)).6 Many human rights advocates rejoiced when the UN
that local militia have detained staff members of the International Criminal Court,
stifling efforts to bring Qaddafi to court).
3. See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar, Syrian Forces Shell Cities as Opposition
Picks Leader, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/11/
world/middleeast/syrian-forces-shell-cities-as-opposition-picks-leader.html.
4. See, e.g., Michael Slackman, Bullets Stall Youthful Push for Arab Spring,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/world/
middleeast/18youth.html?pagewanted=all (recounting how young people have
used social media to organize revolutions in the Arab Spring, and noting that the
youth who once led the peaceful protests now must often focus on defending
themselves and the movement from aggressors); see also Interview by Marc Hall
with Pilar Morales, Head of Strategic Planning & Res. Mobilization, Council of
Europe (Sept. 7, 2012), available at http://www.euractiv.com/global-europe/
council-europe-advisor-political-interview-514700 (explaining that the Council of
Europe understands that the Arab Spring, and specifically in the southern
Mediterranean, will take years to be fully realized).
5. Juan Mendez, Professor, Am. Univ., Remarks at the American University
International Law Review Symposium: The Impact of the Arab Spring Throughout
the Middle East & Northern Africa (Feb. 14, 2012); see also Diane Orentlicher,
Professor, Am. Univ., Remarks at the American University International Law
Review Symposium: The Impact of the Arab Spring Throughout the Middle East
& Northern Africa (Feb. 14, 2012).
6. See Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Suspends Libya
from Human Rights Council; Hopes of Libyan People ‘Must Not be Dashed’
Assembly President Says, As Secretary-General Voices ‘Grave Concern’ at
Ongoing Violence Against Civilians, para. 3, U.N. Press Release GA/11050 (Mar.
1, 2011) (“The world has spoken with one voice: we demand an immediate end to
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Security Council referred the situation in Libya to the ICC and when
the Libya intervention was justified in terms of the international
“responsibility to protect” (“R2P”).7 To the optimist, these
developments reflect the renewed vitality of international legal
institutions and will further speed the development of human rights–
related international legal norms.
On the other hand, the Arab Spring demonstrated equally the
limits and dangers of these same institutions and norms. At the
outset, it’s probably worth noting the early irrelevance of
international law and institutions to the Arab Spring. For most of the
last few decades, international law and institutions did little or
nothing to improve conditions in the Arab World. Indeed, the
repressive regimes of the Middle East were always asterisks to the
global trend toward democratization; even as autocratic regimes in
Latin America, Russia, and Eastern Europe tumbled, oil-rich Arab
political leaders clung to power, with little protest from the United
States or other powerful nations. As long as the oil flowed, few
wealthy states were inclined to push too hard for reform. It’s
unsurprising, then, that change ultimately came from within, not
from without. The starring roles in the Arab Spring have been played
not by international actors but by the citizens of the Arab World
themselves—by street vendors, students, tech entrepreneurs, and
other ordinary people. International institutions—and certainly
powerful nations such as the United States—have been followers, not
leaders.
When changing facts on the ground meant that the Security
Council and its five permanent members could no longer ignore the
Arab Spring, their response was equivocal. The Council referred
Libya to the International Criminal Court8 but provided no additional
resources to assist the already-overwhelmed prosecutor with his
the violence against civilians and full respect for their fundamental human rights,
including those of peaceful assembly and free speech”); see also Andrew Porter,
Arab Spring Will Add to Extremism if We Do Not Help, Says David Cameron,
TELEGRAPH (May 27, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/davidcameron/8539420/Arab-Spring-will-add-to-extremism-if-we-do-not-help-saysDavid-Cameron.html (advocating that extremism and mass immigration will
prevail if protestors are not supported in their quest for democracy).
7. S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (2011) (Feb. 26, 2011); S.C. Res.
1973, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (2011) (Mar. 17, 2011).
8. S.C. Res. 1970 (2011), supra note 7, ¶ 4.
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investigations, making effective ICC action difficult. Blessed by the
Security Council, NATO intervened militarily in Libya to protect the
civilian population from predation by Qaddafi’s forces,9 but the
international community showed little interest in providing
substantial financial or governance assistance to the Libyan
opposition once Qaddafi was overthrown.10
The Security Council has shown even less interest in using
military force to protect civilians in Bahrain or Syria: in Bahrain,
U.S. security considerations militate against anything that could
threaten the Bahrain-based headquarters of the Navy’s Fifth Fleet,11
while in Syria, Russian opposition and U.S. concerns about military
overextension have so far squelched serious discussion of using force
to protect Syrian civilians.12 As the R2P in Libya morphed from
civilian protection to regime change—and as political considerations
appeared to trump humanitarian considerations in Bahrain, Syria, and
elsewhere—early claims about the triumphant operationalization of
the R2P began to ring hollow.13
9. S.C. Res. 1973 (2011), supra note 7.
10. See Gaddafi’s Regime Looks Like a Beacon of Light Compared to the
Current Gov’t, RT (Oct. 8, 2012), http://rt.com/news/bani-walid-gaddafi-libya944/ (criticizing the United Nations for failing to assist the residents of Bani Walid
under siege and for its inability to create a legitimate post-Gaddafi government);
see also Marie-Louise Gumuchian, Shattered Gaddafi Town Says Forgotten in
New Libya, REUTERS, Feb. 29, 2012, available at http://af.reuters.com/
article/worldNews/idAF TRE81S0 TN20120229 (discussing the challenges the
Libyan city of Sirte has undergone since revolution and reporting that the town has
not received any official support to rebuild its city other than humanitarian aid).
11. See Ali Al-Ahmed, Limited Options for the U.S., N.Y. TIMES ROOM FOR
DEBATE BLOG (May 30, 2012, 1:36 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/
2012/05/29/nudging-bahrain-without-pushing-it-away/limited-options-for-the-usin-bahrain (stating that the United States has not attempted to bring Bahrain before
the UN Security Council, supports Bahrain’s monarchy, and has not pressed for
sanctions against Bahrain for its human rights violations).
12. See Patrick Wintour & Ewen MacAskill, Obama Fails to Secure Support
from Putin on Solution to Syria Crisis, GUARDIAN (June 18, 2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/18/obama-support-putin-syria-g20
(noting that Russia is reluctant to break its alliance with Syria and describing
disagreement between U.S. President Obama and Russian President Putin
regarding supporting a regime change in Syria).
13. Compare Romesh Ratnesar, Libya: The Case for U.S. Intervention, TIME
(Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.time.com/ time/nation/article/0,8599,2057470,00.html
(arguing that using the R2P principle can strategically benefit the United States
because it shows support for democratic movements in Muslim countries while
allowing the United States to limit its involvement), with Michelle Nichols, U.N.
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Nonetheless, the international legal response to the Arab Spring
may prove more portentous in the long run than in the short run.
True, R2P may have been operationalized only in an equivocal
manner, but the fact that it was invoked at all may reflect a
substantial shift in the international consensus on sovereignty,
intervention, and the use of force. This is particularly true when
one considers that the emergence and operationalization of R2P,14
with its sovereignty-limiting logic, has been paralleled by similar
shifts in security-based assertions about sovereignty and the use of
force.
As I will explain, evolving ideas about sovereignty—coming from
both the humanitarian discourse and the counterterrorism
discourse—suggest a shift away from traditional assumptions about
the right of a sovereign state to be free of external interference in its
internal affairs, and toward more permissive norms relating to
interventions and the use of force. This trend is exacerbated by
significant improvements in surveillance and weapons-delivery
technologies—specifically, through the use of unmanned aerial
vehicles (“UAVs”), more commonly known as “drones.” These
technological changes, in combination with changes in international
norms relating to sovereignty and the use of force, may serve to
reduce the political and economic costs of military interventions for
powerful states. By so doing, they profoundly challenge the
collective security structure created by the UN Charter and call into
question international law’s ability to meaningfully constrain the use
of force at all.

Chief Says Security Council Paralysis Harming Syrian People, REUTERS (Sept. 5,
2012) (discussing that, while there have been successes in the context of R2P,
“these efforts will not avert the worst if they are not accompanied by action by
influential Governments to find a political solution. The Council’s paralysis does
the Syrian people harm. It also damages its own credibility and weakens a concept
that was adopted with such hope and expectations”).
14. See generally 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–40,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005) (declaring that each state must protect its
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against
humanity, and that the “international community” may intervene when a state fails
to do so); U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,
U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Implementing the Responsibility
to Protect] (outlining the processes and procedures for R2P intervention as a threepillar strategy).
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I. CHANGES IN NORMATIVE UNDERSTANDINGS
OF SOVEREIGNTY
Let me take a step back and say more about recent shifts in
normative conceptions of sovereignty—shifts in which the
emergence of the R2P construct plays a significant role. The last two
decades have seen a dramatic shift away from traditional,
Westphalian ideas about state sovereignty. Increasingly, both legal
scholars and national and international-level advocates and political
decision-makers have articulated an understanding of state
sovereignty as limited and subject to what amounts to de facto
waiver.15 In this vision of sovereignty, sovereignty is less a right
inherent in all states than a privilege that must be earned through
good behavior. A state is required to execute certain
responsibilities.16 If it fails to do so, external actors have a right—
perhaps an obligation—to step in themselves to ensure proper
execution of its responsibilities.
In the human rights community, this vision of sovereignty is often
couched in terms of atrocity prevention and R2P. As noted, this
vision came to the fore during the Arab Spring in reaction to the
actions of Moamar Qaddafi. But during the years immediately
preceding the Arab Spring, parallel versions of this argument also
emerged from within the national security community. Here, the
argument has generally been couched in terms of state duties to
prevent the export of terrorism, and while it originated during the
Bush Administration, it has been elaborated most explicitly by
15. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility: Rep. of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,
2004; David Aronofsky, The International Legal Responsibility to Protect Against
Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: Why National Sovereignty
Does Not Preclude Its Exercise, 13 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 317 (2007);
Catherine Powell, Libya: A Multilateral Constitutional Moment?, 106 AM. J. INT’L
L. 298 (2012).
16. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 14, ¶ 138 (requiring states to prevent and protect
their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against
humanity “through appropriate and necessary means”); Implementing the
Responsibility to Protect, supra note 14, ¶¶ 13–27 (describing states’ responsibility
to foster respect among disparate groups, protect human rights, become parties to
relevant international agreements, assist the International Criminal Court in
apprehending individuals within their states, prevent massive crimes, regularly
assess their internal mechanisms, and encourage individual responsibility).
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members of the Obama Administration in 2011 and 2012.17 Even as
drone strikes in Libya helped operationalize R2P, drone strikes in
Yemen, Pakistan, and elsewhere have begun to operationalize a
counterterrorism-driven shift in conceptions of sovereignty.

A. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
Since World War II, international law has struggled to address the
tensions between Westphalian sovereignty, human rights, and
increased globalization. The UN Charter reflects these tensions; even
as it introduces the notion of universal human rights and empowers
the Security Council to use force in the name of international peace
and security, it emphasizes that, aside from such enforcement
actions, the United Nations is not to “intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”18 For
decades, states wishing to fend off inquiries into their human rights
practices used the principle of sovereign non-intervention as a shield,
asserting that such inquiries represent unwarranted interference in
their domestic affairs.19
By the beginning of the 1990s, this position had become more
difficult to maintain, as the rising number of multilateral human
rights treaties began to “internationalize” previously domestic
matters. (In international trade and economics, multinational treaty
regimes similarly internationalized large swathes of economic
policy.) In the 1990s, ethnic cleansing, torture, massacres, and
genocide in the Balkans and Rwanda further eroded international
support for traditional principles of sovereign non-interference. By
the late 1990s, debates about the legality and morality of
“humanitarian intervention” had taken center stage in international
law reviews and in international fora such as the UN.
17. See Steven R. Weisman, Bush Defends His Goal of Spreading Democracy
to the Mideast, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/
27/politics/27diplo.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print; see also Hillary Rodham
Clinton, Secretary of State, Remarks at the Munich Security Conference Plenary
Session (Feb. 5, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/
156044.htm.
18. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
19. Consider China’s attitude toward Western criticism of its human rights
practices. See, e.g., Chris Buckley, China Tells U.S. to Quit as Human Rights
Judge, REUTERS, Apr. 10, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/
04/10/us-china-usa-rights-idUSTRE7382EH20110410.
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By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the 1990s’ debates
over humanitarian intervention had shifted into a discussion of the
so-called R2P, a doctrine initially developed by the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (“ICISS”).
ICISS—initially an initiative of the Canadian government—was
tasked with reflecting on a decade of atrocities and the varying
international response to genocide and ethnic cleansing.20 (In Bosnia,
a NATO-led military intervention was authorized by the UN Security
Council; in Rwanda, the international community stood idly by as
close to a million people were slaughtered; in Kosovo, NATO
intervened to prevent ethnic cleansing without Security Council
authorization, and the intervention was generally viewed as
appropriate, even if arguably illegal.)
ICISS sought to come to terms with this ambiguous legacy by
offering a quite different vision of sovereignty from that taken for
granted prior to World War II. In a 2011 report, ICISS asserted that
“State sovereignty implies responsibility . . . [w]here a population is
suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency,
repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or
unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to
the international responsibility to protect.”21
ICISS took pains to observe that the responsibility to protect might
involve the use of many measures short of military force, from
humanitarian aid to economic sanctions. The use of force to protect
populations should be a last resort, emphasized the ICISS report, and
any R2P-based military interventions should be authorized by the
Security Council.22 But it’s important to emphasize that in the
aftermath of Rwanda and Kosovo, ICISS was unwilling to view
Security Council authorization as an absolute requirement:
If the Security Council rejects a proposal [to intervene to protect a
population] or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time, alternative
options . . . [include] action within area of jurisdiction by regional or sub20. See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 81 (2001), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect
.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf (explaining that the Commission was formed to build
consensus among the international community to address massive human rights
violations).
21. Id. at XI.
22. Id. at XII.
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regional organizations under Chapter VIII of the Charter, subject to their
seeking subsequent authorization.23

“Subsequent authorization” is hardly a Charter-based procedure,
but here ICISS appears to have been recalling NATO’s intervention
during the 1999 Kosovo crisis. After all, noted the ICISS report, if
the Security Council “fails to discharge its responsibility to protect in
conscience-shocking situations crying out for action . . . concerned
states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency
of that situation . . . .”24 In Kosovo, concerned states did not rule out
such “other means.”
In relatively short order, the R2P concept gained substantial
traction throughout the international community. It was referenced in
the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document and embraced by
senior U.S. officials.25 Its first serious trial run came in early 2011,
when the Arab Spring hit Libya—and Moamar Qaddafi predictably
responded to protests and a nascent insurgency with threats of
indiscriminate force. His forces, he promised, would go “door to
door,” executing the “cockroaches,” while his son Saif accused the
protestors of “trying to imitate what is happening in Tunisia and
Egypt.”26 Meanwhile, news outlets reported that Libyan government
forces were using fighter jets to strafe crowds of civilian protestors.27
23. See id. at XIII.
24. Id.
25. See G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 14, ¶¶ 138–39 (stating that each individual
state and the international community have the responsibility to protect populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity).
26. See Libya Protests: Defiant Gaddafi Refuses to Quit, BBC NEWS (Feb. 22,
2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12544624
(recounting
Qaddafi’s first speech in response to protests, in which he referred to Chinese
authorities’ crushing of protests in Tiananmen Square as an example of action
necessary to preserve national unity); Vivienne Walt, Libya: Gaddafi’s Son Warns
Against Protests in TV Speech, TIME (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.time.com/
time/world/article/0,8599,2052842,00.html (reporting that Saif al-Islam, Qaddafi’s
heir apparent, made a speech in which he blamed a plot against Libya for the
protests and scolded young people trying to imitate protestors in Tunisia and
Egypt).
27. See, e.g., David Kirkpatrick & Mona El-Naggar, Qaddafi’s Grip Falters as
His Forces Take on Protestors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/world/africa/22libya.html
(“Roving
the
streets in trucks, [Qaddafi’s forces] shot freely as planes dropped what witnesses
described as ‘small bombs’ and helicopters fired on protesters.”).
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As President Obama later put it, by attacking his own citizens,
Qaddafi “lost the confidence of his people and the legitimacy to
lead,” and the “responsibilities to defend the Libyan people” fell
upon the international community.28 The Security Council accepted
the same logic, authorizing, in Resolution 1973, the use of force to
protect civilians in Libya.29
This was not the end of the story, of course. Although the Arab
Spring gave rise to the first full-scale R2P-based international
intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state, the doctrine (or
“emerging international norm,” as U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations Susan Rice carefully phrased it)30 was soon deployed again
by the Security Council in Resolution 1975, authorizing the use of
force in Cote D’Ivoire.31 R2P has also been invoked in the context of
Syria to justify sanctions and other non-military actions.32
Although (so far) there has been no international appetite for
military intervention in Syria, it’s clear that that the R2P genie is out
of the bottle: the world’s leading powers have declared, individually
and through the Security Council, that sovereignty implies a legal
duty to protect civilian populations, and that states that fail in this
28. Barack Obama, President, Address to the Nation on Libya (Mar. 28, 2011),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarkspresident-address-nation-libya (counting the international coalition to defend the
Libyan people as including the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Norway, Italy,
Spain, Greece, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar).
29. See S.C. Res. 1973 (2011), supra note 7, ¶ 4 (authorizing Member States
“to take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas
under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while
excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan
territory.”).
30. See Susan E. Rice, Why Darfur Can’t Be Left to Africa, WASH. POST (Aug.
7, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/05/
AR2005080501988.html (suggesting that the R2P doctrine be applied to genocide
in Darfur).
31. See S.C. Res. 1975, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1975 (2011) (Mar. 30, 2011)
(authorizing the United Nations Operations in Cote D’Ivoire “to use all necessary
means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of
violence . . . .”).
32. See, e.g., Bennett Ramberg, Applying the Responsibility to Protect to Syria,
YALE GLOBAL ONLINE (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/
applying-responsibility-protect-syria (proposing R2P actions that the international
community may take in Syria, including amnesty to Syrian forces who defect,
lobbying Russia and China to support R2P, and molding of the divided opposition
forces into a united interim government).
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duty can no longer assume a sovereign right to be free of outside
interference, including the use of force.
To date, all uses of force in the name of R2P have had Security
Council authorization. But while most post-ICISS elaborations of
R2P have—for obvious reasons—tended to downplay the possibility
of military interventions undertaken without Security Council
authorization, the normative logic of R2P suggests that ICISS was
right to conclude that Security Council authorization should not be
dispositive.
Indeed, the R2P framework implies that the lawfulness of state
authority is dependent on the capacity and will to protect populations
from at least certain kinds of egregious harms. If sovereignty
involves a responsibility to protect, and a state’s failure to protect its
own population triggers a responsibility to protect in other states, this
responsibility of third-party states must logically exist whether or not
a politicized and highly veto-prone body chooses to acknowledge it
or authorize particular actions. By extension, if the responsibility to
protect is based on universal values and shared humanity, rather than
the technicalities of citizenship and borders, third-party states that
shirk their own responsibilities to protect might themselves be
viewed as losing legitimacy.
To be clear, this is far from a universally accepted understanding
of R2P. It is, however, an understanding of R2P that’s “out there,”
available for use and deployment by states and other actors.33 Will
the United States or other states someday seek to justify a use of
force on R2P grounds even if the Security Council doesn’t authorize
force? There’s no way to know for sure, but I do not consider it
implausible. After all, in 1999—before the advent of R2P—the
United States, without Security Council blessing, intervened in
33. See Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 513, 513–14 (2009), available at http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/20/3/1849.pdf
(arguing that a state’s sovereignty must be justified by its protection of basic
human rights and that when a state grossly fails to fulfill these duties, its
sovereignty is suspended, leaving the international community responsible to meet
human needs); Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking
Humanitarian Intervention, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS 78, 82–
83 (2004) (contending that the case for conceiving of sovereignty as responsibility
is strengthened by the increasing impact of international human rights norms and
the extension of the concept of security from the state to people).
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Kosovo. Then, as now in Syria, the threat of a Russian veto
torpedoed any hope of UN authorization, but NATO acted anyway. I
find it hard to doubt that the United States and its NATO allies
would do the same again in the name of R2P, should circumstances
in Syria or elsewhere come to seem sufficiently urgent. For now,
prudential considerations have militated against the use of force in
Syria, but this may yet change.

B. COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE “UNWILLING OR UNABLE” TEST
The Arab Spring took the R2P genie out of its bottle, but as I
noted earlier, R2P is not the only sovereignty-limiting “emerging
norm” to have surfaced in recent years. Looking at the post-9/11
counter-terrorism discourse in the United States, we can see
strikingly similar logic at play. (Indeed, the initial ICISS report on
the Responsibility to Protect was thoroughly upstaged by history,
coming only two months after the terrorist attacks of September
2011.) Even as the NATO intervention in Kosovo was causing
international lawyers to reevaluate old ideas about sovereignty and
humanitarian imperatives, the 9/11 attacks caused a similar
reevaluation of old ideas about sovereignty and the use of force in
defense of self or others.
The UN Charter laid out reasonably clear rules governing the use
of force. Under the collective security regime created by the Charter,
force was not to be used inside the territory of a sovereign state
unless the state at issue consented, the Security Council authorized
the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or the use of
force was in self-defense following an “armed attack” as delineated
by Article 51 of the UN Charter. Traditional interpretations of the
right to self-defense enshrined in the Charter included the right of a
state to use force to prevent an “imminent” attack, but for the most
part states construed the idea of imminence relatively narrowly—
parallel, essentially, to the way most domestic jurisdictions
understand self-defense and imminent threat.34
The 9/11 attacks changed this. They laid bare the manner in which
34. See, e.g., John Bassett Moore, Destruction of the “Caroline,” in 2 DIG.
INT’L L. 409, 412 (1906) (describing the exchange of diplomatic notes between
Great Britain and the United States about whether the destruction of The Caroline
by the British was a justified act of self-defense against piracy).
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globalization and its drivers (changes in communication,
transportation, and weapons technologies, for instance) had
accelerated the movement of money and materiel and reduced the
salience of international borders and state monopolies on the use of
force. In an era in which threats emanating from one state’s territory
can migrate almost instantly to another state’s territory, the logic of
sovereign non-intervention principles loses force. Unsurprisingly,
post-9/11 counterterrorism concerns triggered the rapid emergence of
normative and legal arguments for expanding the basis for using
force within the territory of other states.
Within the national security community, there were generally two
strands to these arguments. First, in the Bush Administration’s
embrace of so-called “preemptive” self-defense, the traditional
Charter-based justification for using force in self-defense was
expanded and used to justify the war in Iraq. The logic underlying
the Bush argument was straightforward (though the facts,
inconveniently, were less so): in the age of ballistic missiles and
nuclear, chemical, and biological threats, states may only have a
moment’s notice (if any) before an imminent and devastating
attack.35 Surely the framers of the UN Charter would not have
required states to wait for such an attack to occur or be imminent in
the traditional and restrictive sense before they could lawfully use
force in self-defense—even if that meant using force inside another
sovereign state’s territory!
This extension of the principle of self-defense stretches traditional
understandings of sovereignty—but the second strand of
counterterrorism-based arguments justifying the use of force raises
even more fundamental challenges to old notions of sovereignty.
Consider drone strikes and other cross-border uses of force outside
of so-called “hot” battlefields (e.g., outside places such as
35. See THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf (“We must adapt the
concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries
. . . . The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more
compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or
prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary,
act preemptively.”).
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Afghanistan and Iraq, where U.S. ground troops have been engaged).
Since 2011, the United States has repeatedly used force inside the
borders of sovereign states with which it is not in an armed conflict,
at times without the consent of the affected state. In October 2008,
for instance, U.S. troops in Iraq crossed over into Syria and attacked
targets within Syria’s borders.36 The United States has also attacked
targets inside Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and perhaps Mali and the
Philippines.37 In some cases, the affected states—all, not
coincidentally, with substantial Arab or Muslim populations—have
consented to the United States’ use of force.38 In other cases, their
consent is, at best, questionable.39
36. See CROSS-BORDER ATTACK ON SYRIA RAISES IRANIAN EYEBROWS, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (OCT. 30, 2008), HTTP://WWW.CFR.ORG/IRAN/CROSSBORDER-ATTACK-SYRIA-RAISES-IRANIAN-EYEBROWS/P17648.
37. See Osama bin Laden Killed in Pakistan, AL JAZEERA (May 2, 2011),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2011/05/2011522132275789.html;
Charlie Savage, Relatives Sue U.S. Officials over U.S. Citizens Killed by Drone
Strikes in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/
world/middleeast/us-officials-sued-over-citizens-killed-in-yemen.html; Deaths in
US Drone Strikes in Somalia, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 25, 2012),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/02/201222505924775127.html;
see
also Afua Hirsch, Islamist Rebels Vow Assault on Malian Capital if International
Forces Attack, GUARDIAN (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2012/oct/29/mali-africa (reporting that the United States’ combating Al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is a source of controversy in Mali and that
surveillance drones are currently operating in the country); Alexis Romero, AFP
Denies US Drone Attack in Phl, PHILIPPINE STAR (July 10, 2012),
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2012/07/10/826274/afp-denies-us-drone-attackphl (relaying that the armed forces of the Philippines deny allowing the United
States to attack Indonesian terrorist Umar Patek in their territory and that, under
Philippine law, the activity of U.S. soldiers is limited to information sharing and
training).
38. See
e.g.,
Greg
Miller,
In
Interview,
Yemeni
President
Acknowledges Approving U.S. Drone Strikes, WASH. POST (Sept. 29,
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/yemeni-presidentacknowledges-approving-us-drone-strikes/2012/09/29/09bec2ae-0a56-11e2-afffd6c7f20a83bf_story.html?hpid=z1.
39. One difficulty is raised by the fact that the affected state may agree in
private to allow U.S. strikes but object in public. This, and the secrecy surrounding
most of these strikes, makes it difficult to fully evaluate the degree to which
consent has been obtained. See, e.g., Adam Entous et al., US Unease over Drone
Strikes: Obama Administration Charts Delicate Legal Path Defending
Controversial Weapons, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 26, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10000872396390444100404577641520858011452.html (reporting that,
although Pakistan publicly opposes UAV strikes within its territory, the U.S.
government infers Pakistan’s tacit consent to strikes when Pakistan’s intelligence
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The United States has offered only the most minimal legal
justification for these actions (even the existence of a CIA drone
program remains classified), but the logic relied upon appears
structurally identical to that embraced by proponents of the R2P:
sovereign rights are accompanied by responsibilities; states must
refrain from internal activities that threaten the citizens or basic
security of other states, and must prevent non-state actors from
engaging in such activities inside their borders. Thus, if a state
supports or tolerates terrorists within its borders, it is failing to
uphold its sovereign responsibilities, and other states are entitled to
use force within its borders if doing so is necessary to protect
themselves or uphold global security.40
As President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor John
Brennan stated in a 2011 speech, “[The United States] reserve[s] the
right to take unilateral action if or when other governments are
unwilling or unable to take the necessary actions themselves.”41
Attorney General Eric Holder put forward a similar view in a March
2012 speech: “Our government has both a responsibility and a right
to protect this nation and its people.”42 And while “[i]nternational
legal principles, including respect for another nation’s sovereignty,
constrain our ability to act unilaterally. . . . the use of force in foreign
territory would be consistent with these international legal principles
if conducted, for example, with the consent of the nation involved –
or after a determination that the nation [in which terrorists are
present] is unable or unwilling to deal effectively with a threat to the
United States.”43
Although neither Brennan nor Holder acknowledges it, this view
service is informed of and does not respond to U.S. plans).
40. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001) (Sept. 28, 2001)
(noting that states must prevent and suppress, in their territories through all lawful
means, the financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism).
41. John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. &
Counterterrorism, Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and
Laws (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adheringour-values-an.
42. Eric Holder, Att’y General, Address at Northwestern University School of
Law (Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/
ag-speech-1203051.html.
43. Id.
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effectively makes a mockery of traditional claims about sovereign
non-intervention. After all, the notion that force can be used inside a
sovereign state if the state either consents or is viewed (by a thirdparty state!) as “unwilling or unable” to “take the necessary actions”
is entirely circular. If a state consents, the use of force by a thirdparty state—the United States—is legally acceptable; if a state does
not consent, however, in a situation in which the United States
regards force as necessary, then—by definition—that state is
“unwilling or unable” in the eyes of the United States, and force is
also then legally acceptable. It’s difficult to see much left of the idea
of sovereign non-intervention here.

C. THE CONVERGENCE OF SOVEREIGNTY-LIMITING THEORIES
Against a backdrop of turmoil in the Arab World, the human rights
and national security discourses appear to be converging on
structurally parallel sovereignty-limiting theories. Each has the effect
of legitimizing and reinforcing the other, though neither the human
rights community nor the national security community is inclined to
acknowledge this.
I believe the R2P coin ought logically be seen as having two sides:
on one side lies a state’s duty to take action inside its own territory to
protect its own population from violence and atrocities (this is the
R2P beloved by the human rights community). On the other side lies
a state’s duty to take action inside its own territory to protect other
states’ populations from violence (this version of R2P remains
submerged, but it’s the version embraced by many in the
counterterrorism community, though they would never use the term
R2P). On either side of the coin, a state that fails in its protective
duties faces the prospect that other states will intervene in its
“internal” affairs without its consent and, quite possibly, without the
Security Council’s consent.
To be clear, my purpose here is descriptive rather than
prescriptive. I do not assert that any of this is either wise or close to
being settled law. R2P’s scope, meaning, and legal status remain
controversial, and the U.S. legal defense of recent drone strikes and
other cross-border uses of force is even more so. Nonetheless, each
of these normative frameworks is articulated with increasing
frequency, each is couched in legal terms, and each offers the raw
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materials from which states and other actors can construct legally
plausible arguments. Whether the trend I have noted here is to be
welcomed or condemned is beyond the scope of this article. But the
existence of the trend is increasingly incontrovertible.

II. CHANGING TECHNOLOGIES
As noted earlier, the rapid evolution of these sovereignty-limiting
doctrines has been paralleled (and perhaps enabled) by a similarly
rapid evolution in technologies that collectively make cross-border
uses of force less costly. Surveillance technologies have improved
dramatically in the last two decades, enabling powerful states to
more effectively and accurately determine the location, numbers, and
motivations of actors they deem to pose security threats—or the
actors engaged in atrocities against civilians. Weapons technologies
and delivery systems have also improved, enabling greater precision
in targeting and less collateral damage. And the development of
increasingly sophisticated UAVs not only assists with intelligence
gathering and precision targeting, but eliminates any immediate risk
to the military or intelligence personnel who control them.
Taken together, these technological changes reduce the risks and
costs of using force inside the borders of other sovereign states.
Unmanned aerial vehicles in particular have become a game-changer
for the United States: they’re substantially cheaper to make and
maintain than manned aircraft; they can spend much more “time on
target,” which increases the likelihood that a given strike will hit
only its intended target (rather than nearby civilians, for instance);
and their use poses no risk to their operators, who remain safely far
from the strike zone.44
Compared to the methods available even fifteen years ago, today’s
surveillance and weapons technologies permit states to use force at
lower cost in both monetary and human terms. When targets are
limited and well-defined, states no longer need to risk the lives of
ground troops or human pilots to strike targets, and they can feel
44. See generally Bradley J. Strawser, Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ
Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles, 9 J. MIL. ETHICS 342 (2010) (advocating an ethical
duty to employ UAVs when military action is justified because UAVs are cost
effective, are accurate in discriminating between combatant and noncombatant,
and eliminate risks to operators).
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more confident that there will be no significant civilian deaths (thus
reducing the odds of international condemnation). Strikes become
more “surgical.” And this seems likely to produce changes in state
behavior: if states perceive the costs of using force to be lower, their
willingness to use force will be higher.

III. WHEN LEGAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL
TRENDS INTERSECT: IMPLICATIONS
When sovereignty-limiting theories such as R2P and the
“unwilling or unable” counterterrorism framework are available to
states, the perceived reputational costs of using force inside the
borders of other sovereign states will go down. Combine these
normative and doctrinal developments with technological changes
that reduce the financial and human cost of using of force inside
other states’ borders, and the threshold for using force will get lower
still.
None of this was caused by the Arab Spring, but these changes
have played out primarily against its backdrop. The Libya
intervention became the proving ground for R2P, and the U.S.NATO intervention was enabled not only by the existence of this
permissive doctrine, but also by the relatively new ability to employ
UAVs for precision airstrikes. Had the United States and NATO
been forced to rely solely on traditional air power—with its need for
vulnerable human targets and its trade-offs between ensuring the
safety of flight crews and flying low enough for accurate target
identification—it is possible the Libya intervention might never have
occurred. The availability of UAVs—which were relied upon heavily
during the Libya intervention—enabled the Obama Administration to
launch a relatively cheap and “risk-free” war, easily bypassing
domestic legal strictures such as the War Powers Act (with no troops
on the ground and no “fighting,” the Administration could plausibly
claim that the War Powers Act did not apply).45
45. See Nick Hopkins, British Pilots Flew Armed US Drones in Libya, MoD
Reveals, GUARDIAN (July 26, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/26/
british-pilots-drones-libya (reporting that, between April and October 2011, NATO
and the United States conducted 145 UAV strikes in Libya); see also Charlie
Savage & Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role in Libya
Operation, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/us/
politics/16powers.html?_r=0 (describing U.S. President Obama’s position that the
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Similarly, the Arab and Muslim World has also been the proving
ground for counterterrorism-based sovereignty-limiting theories.
Here too, the presence both of enabling legal discourses and
technologies rendering the use of force safe and economical has led
to an increase in the use of force. The growing acceptance of
sovereignty-limiting doctrines has muted international legal criticism
of U.S. drone strikes, while the availability of UAVs has tempted the
United States to go after an ever-expanding list of targets, from
Yemen and Pakistan to Somalia.
The emergence of sovereignty-limiting doctrines and more
permissive theories about the use of force reflects changed facts on
the ground. Sometimes states engage in such egregious atrocities
against their own populations that morality, if not law, appears to
demand a response. Sometimes states will be unwilling or unable to
take action against terrorist groups operating inside their borders,
even when those groups pose a grave threat to the populations of
other states. In an age in which technologies, money, people, and
materiel can cross borders rapidly and easily, it seems unreasonable
to expect those states that are threatened to stand idly by—
particularly when new weapons technologies appear to enable swift,
controlled, and effective responses.
The clock can’t be turned back—yet these linked normative and
technological developments raise obvious and glaring issues for
those concerned with the international rule of law. Whether a
potential use of force is justified on counterterrorism grounds or on
humanitarian and human rights grounds, the slippery slope is
apparent. Who gets to judge when a state should be deemed to have
“waived” its sovereignty and abrogated its responsibilities? Who gets
to decide when a use of force inside the border of a non-consenting
state is lawful? How much force is acceptable? And which actors get
to use force? A single state acting unilaterally? Regional
organizations? Coalitions of the willing? If each state begins to claim
the right to judge for itself when force can be used inside the borders
of another state, the world will become an even more frightening and
unstable place, given the continued weakness of most existing
international institutions.

War Powers Resolution does not apply to its involvement in Libya).
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Whether the international legal community will get serious about
the difficult project of developing alternate forms of restraint and
accountability remains to be seen. But in decades to come, when we
look back upon the recent turbulence in the Arab World, we may
recall it less for the political changes it brought about within Arab
states than for the changes in normative conceptions of sovereignty
and the use of force that accompanied it.

